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I review the literature on the effects of inequality on growth and development in the developing 
world.  Two stylized facts emerge from empirical studies: inequality is more likely to harm growth in 
countries at low levels of income (below about $3200 per capita in 2000 dollars); and it is at high 
levels of inequality (at or above a Gini coefficient of .45) that a negative association emerges. 
Between 15 and 40 percent of the developing world's population lives in countries with these 
characteristics, depending on the inclusion of China, whose level of inequality has recently been 
measured at almost .45.  Theory and evidence suggest that high inequality affects growth: (1) through 
interaction with incomplete and  underdeveloped markets for capital and information; (2) by 
discouraging the evolution of the economic and political institutions associated with accountable 
government (which in turn enable a market environment conducive to investment and growth); and 
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∗ President, Center for Global Development, Washington D.C. (nbirdsall@cgdev.org).  I am grateful to my 
former and current research assistants: Gunilla Pettersson for helping outline the issues and to Christine 
Park for her help with data, and to Lyn Squire, John Williamson and Amitava Krishna Dutt  for their 
thoughtful comments on an earlier draft. This paper was meant to be co-authored with Richard Sabot, with 
whom I enjoyed spirited discussions about its content and emphasis before his untimely death in 2005; this 
paper reflects inadequately those discussions and the contribution he would have made.    Until the end of the Cold War, most development economists were not particularly 
concerned with the distribution of income, but instead with understanding growth and 
reducing absolute poverty in the developing world.  For one thing, Kuznets (1955) had 
suggested that a deterioration in the distribution of income might be the natural outcome 
of the early stages of development, as people begin the shift from low-productivity 
subsistence agriculture to high-productivity sectors. And mainstream economists’ starting 
assumption, rooted in the Smithian tradeoff between efficiency and equity was that, in the 
other direction of causation, inequality resulting for example from increased security of 
property rights, would enhance growth by encouraging investment and savings and  
creating a necessary incentive for individuals to work hard.
1   
But beginning in the 1990s, as panel data on changes in the distribution of income in 
developing countries became available, as mainstream development economists became 
more concerned with political economy analysis, and—perhaps—once the fall of the 
Berlin Wall liberated the mainstream from the taboo of Marxian analysis, economists 
became more interested in assessing the effects of income distribution on growth. In the 
last 15 years a major focus of new theoretical and empirical work has been the effects of 
income inequality on growth and development in the developing world.  Much of that 
work has been ably reviewed in major reports of the UNDP, the Inter-American 
Development Bank, and the World Bank.
2  
                                                 
1 For example, Finis Welch entitled his 1999 address to the American Economics Association “In Defense 
of Inequality”. The reference to the Smithian tradeoff is to Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments published 
in 1759 (Smith,1982).  Kaldor (1961) noted that a higher profit share would encourage savings on the 
assumption that capitalists have a higher propensity to save, from which it follows that when income is 
more concentrated savings and investment and thus the equilibrium rate of growth will be higher.   
2 Smith in Wealth of Nations published in 1776  (cited as Smith, 1982). The 1998 Human Development 
Report, Consumption for Human Development of the UNDP, led by Richard Jolly, included analysis of 
consumption inequality. The 1998/1999 IPES of the IDB, led by Ricardo Hausmann, the Chief Economist, 
was entitled Facing Up to Inequality in Latin America.  The 2006 World Development Report of the World 
  1Still there is no consensus among economists that income inequality matters, and 
little attention among development practitioners to policies to address inequality as 
opposed to growth and poverty reduction.
3  
Obviously if people care about their relative income status then ipso facto inequality 
matters.  That they do, to some extent, has long been remarked; consider Adam Smith  
who noted that a man to retain his dignity may in one society need enough income to buy 
a linen shirt, and Veblen (1970) who noted that the absolutely well-off worry about their 
status relative to the more absolutely well-off.
4  Hirschman (1973) observed that people 
stuck in a tunnel in the stopped lane eventually become deeply frustrated if the other lane 
but not theirs has been inexplicably (and presumably unfairly) moving—quite 
independent, to extend the metaphor, of the kind of car they drive.  Easterlin (1995) noted 
that happiness (or subjective well-being, or utility to use the economists’ term) varies 
directly with one’s own income and inversely with the income of others, i.e. that relative 
as well as absolute income matters.  He comes to that conclusion in part based on surveys 
of happiness within countries over time; the average level of happiness has not increased 
                                                                                                                                                 
Bank, led by Francisco Perreira and Michael Walton, is entitled Equity and Development.  For a review 
from the perspective of new endogenous growth theories in economics, see Aghion et al., 1999. 
3 Lyn Squire (personal correspondence; and see Lundberg and Squire, 2003) makes the point that policy 
recommendations for addressing inequality may not be much different from those meant to address poverty 
in a country with an egalitarian distribution of income. (An exception might be tax policy, which ideally 
might be more progressive in the former setting, if only to sustain politically open markets.  In addition 
greater priority in the face of political and administrative constraints might go to anti-trust and anti-
monopoly programs in high inequality settings)  I do not try to address this point in this paper since it is not 
focused on policy per se but on a review of the implications of inequality for the dynamics of growth in the 
developing world. 
4 Graham and Felton, 2005, provide a survey of recent studies linking measures of “well-being” (or 
reported “happiness” in surveys of individuals) to prevailing levels of inequality.  Results depend on 
setting, definition of reference group, and the particular measure of well-being.  In Europe and the U.S. 
inequality has generally negative effects on reported measures of well-being. 
  2even where average incomes have increased substantially.
5  It is possible in fact that 
inequality of income reduces the utility or happiness not only of the relatively poor but of 
the better-off, who may enjoy their own affluence less if others are visibly worse off.   
In this review I focus, however, on the instrumental reasons why a highly unequal 
distribution of income matters in developing countries.
6  I review a large body of work, 
primarily of economists, indicating that beyond some level inequality in developing 
countries matters because: (1) where markets are underdeveloped, high income inequality 
is likely to inhibit growth; (2) high income inequality can discourage the evolution of the 
economic and political institutions associated with accountable government (which in 
turn enable a market environment conducive to investment and growth); and (3) high 
income inequality can undermine the civic and social life that sustains effective collective 
decision-making, especially in multi-ethnic settings.    
Theory and some empirical work suggest that inequality does not undermine growth 
directly.  Instead it is the interaction of inequality with imperfect markets or with 
unaccountable or incompetent governments (increasingly labeled weak “institutions” in 
the latest literature on growth—see for example Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 
2000) that harms growth.  In addition, and conceptually different, inequality (that is high 
enough) may directly create conditions that lead to or exacerbate poor governance and 
thus poor economic policy, and/or weak social and economic institutions and thus 
                                                 
5 Graham and Pettinato (2002) make the point that what is important is peoples’ perceptions about their 
current and future income relative to others. Graham and Felton (2005) report based on happiness surveys 
that people in Nigeria are as happy as people in France despite the huge discrepancy in per capita incomes.  
6 Much of what I say about income inequality applies to consumption inequality, and much theory reviewed 
below applies better to wealth than to income and consumption inequality.  In principle income inequality 
as I use it refers to “permanent income”, though in fact empirical work on income inequality almost always 
is based on current income, and sometimes on wages and other pretax income.  Elsewhere I have used the 
term “money inequality” to distinguish income and consumption inequality from inequality of 
“opportunity” (which is difficult if not impossible to measure) and of land, education and other 
nonmonetary assets.  See Birdsall, 2001.   
  3ineffective implementation of stable and sound policies—reducing growth through the 
effect on economic, political and social institutions. Weak institutions broadly defined are 
increasingly viewed as the key cause of low growth in developing countries.  Since weak 
markets, poor governance and underdeveloped institutions might be said to be the very 
characteristics that define a country as “developing”, it follows that inequality is a key 
factor in understanding the dynamics of growth and institutional development in the 
developing world.    
The reader will note that I do not discuss the effect of growth on inequality, the 
subject of the Kuznets hypothesis, nor the evidence that inequality and growth may each 
be simultaneously affected (Lundberg and Squire, 2003), either similarly or differently, 
by still other economic and non-economic variables such as inflation and increased 
access to education.  Once panels of household data enabled analysis of changes in the 
distribution of income over time within countries, the existence of a stylized Kuznets 
effect was not supported by the evidence (for example, Deininger and Squire, 1996), 
almost certainly because so many other country-specific factors compound any 
fundamental relationship there might be. 
 
Effect of Inequality on Economic Growth and Poverty: Theory and Evidence 
Two stylized facts emerge from the growing literature on the effects of inequality 
on growth.  First, the evidence suggests that inequality above some level is more likely to 
reduce growth.  Second, theory and empirical work suggest that high levels of inequality 
are more likely to harm growth in developing than in developed countries.   
  4Barro (2000), in a study of the determinants of growth, was among the first to 
report a structurally different relationship of inequality to growth in developing compared 
to developed countries.  Across developed and developing countries combined he found 
no clear effect of inequality on growth.  However dividing the sample into the two groups 
he found the relationship is structurally different. In higher-income developed countries 
inequality may indeed be associated with higher growth (as often referred to in 
contrasting the U.S. and countries of Western Europe). Below a certain income level 
(about $2000 U.S.1985 dollars – equivalent to about U.S.$3200 in 2000 dollars), higher 
income inequality is associated with lower growth. (The simple relationship is illustrated 
for developed and developing countries in Figure 1).  Cornia, Addison and Kiistki (2004) 
using data from a more comprehensive set of household surveys, tested the relationship 
between changes in inequality and growth over almost four decades for 25 countries.  
They report a positive effect on growth as the Gini coefficient increases from very low 
levels (from the .15 typical say of subsistence economies and of the former socialist 
economies to .30) and a negative effect as the Gini coefficient rises from .45 (typical in 
Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa) to higher levels.
7    
The specific thresholds should not be taken too seriously, given poor 
measurement particularly of the distribution of income.  However, they allow for a rough 
assessment of how widespread across people and countries in the developing world might 
be the resulting vulnerability. The critical thresholds of a Gini at or above .45 and income 
per capita at or below $3200 affect a significant number of countries and people in the 
developing world. Virtually no developing or transitional economies have income Gini 
                                                 
7 See Chapter VI. 44 in this volume for a discussion of the Gini coefficient and other measures of 
distribution.  The studies referred to all use panels of country observations and employ country fixed effects 
estimations, so that they are assessing changes over time within countries, not differences across countries.    
  5coefficients below .30, though India and China did at about that level for much of the 
postwar period until the 1990s.  About 15 percent of the population of the developing 
world currently lives in countries (33 countries) with reported Gini coefficients of .45 or 
higher and per capita income below $3200 (in 2000 dollars), mostly in Latin America and 
sub-Saharan Africa.  But that percentage mounts to 40 percent if China, whose reported 
2003 Gini coefficient was 44.9, is included, and rises further to 44 percent if Brazil, 
whose per capita income now just exceeds $3200, is included.  Other countries with per 
capita income below the Barro threshold where the income Gini has risen in the last 15 
years and is now above .40 are Bangladesh and Pakistan.  In India and Vietnam, 
inequality has also risen rapidly since the 1990s but reported Gini coefficients are still 
below .40.
8  
These findings are broadly consistent with theory.  Why might some level of 
inequality enhance growth?  First, inequality can be too low, as when it was imposed in 
state-managed economies where planning and controls replaced price and other market 
signals, encouraging “shirking” and free riding.  A certain degree of inequality may be 
necessary to permit the incentives that induce individuals to work hard, innovate and 
undertake risky but productive investment projects, resulting in higher output and 
productivity, and therefore higher average incomes and growth rates.  (For economists, 
these incentive effects are the backbone of the moral hazard argument against tax-
financed distribution (Okun, 1975)). Second, some concentration of income could 
                                                 
8 Reported Gini coefficients are from the WIDER (WIID2a) database; see  
http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm and WIDER, 2005.  Income per capita is from the World Bank 
World Development Indicators (http://www.worldbank.org/data).  For the statements in this paragraph, I 
used Gini coefficients from as many countries as possible.  For some countries only Gini coefficients of the 
distribution of consumption are available. The distribution of consumption will be more equal than the 
distribution of income so that the number of countries and people in the categories I defined may be higher 
than stated here.  
  6encourage growth if high rates of saving enable more investment, and if savings rates are 
greater where income is concentrated in the hands of the rich whose marginal propensity 
to save is higher than that of the poor (Galenson and Leibenstein, 1955; Kaldor, 1961, 
1978).  A related idea is that investments in infrastructure and industry critical to 
development are large and indivisible; in the absence of well-functioning capital markets, 
wealth and income need to be highly concentrated to generate the minimum required 
resources to undertake new investment projects.
9 (Recent “endogenous” models of 
growth, however, rely much more heavily on the incentive effects of institutions and 
policy than on high savings and investment as the keys to sustained growth.)  
The incentive effects of inequality can be thought of as the outcome of 
“constructive” inequality, that is, income inequality that reflects solely differences in 
individuals’ responses to equal incentives or opportunities, and is thus consistent with 
efficient resource allocation.
10  In contrast would be “destructive” inequality, reflecting 
inefficient privileges for the rich, social and economic discrimination which reduces 
incentives for effort, investment and innovation by some groups, and in general reduced 
potential for productive contributions of the already poor. In a kind of tautology, 
destructive inequality can be defined as that inequality which results in lower, rather than 
higher economic growth (Birdsall, 2001).   
                                                 
9 With this in mind, many developing countries embraced the need for the state to assume the commanding 
heights of the economy and used tax and donor resources to finance state-led industrial investments 
throughout much of the post-war twentieth century. This approach almost certainly, and ironically, led to 
increased concentration of income. Worse, in some countries the later privatization of those investments 
further increased income concentration, though there is also good evidence that privatization of water, 
electricity, and other utilities has improved access to these services of the poor (Nellis and Birdsall 2005). 
10 Rawls (1971) argued that unequal systems of incentives and rewards may be justified if they improve the 
position of the least advantaged.  His fundamental point was that an increase in inequality can only be 
justified if the outcome is an improvement in the welfare of the worst off. 
  7The idea of destructive effects of inequality is consistent with the empirical 
evidence noted above of lower growth at very high measured levels of inequality. Theory 
suggests that inequality is also more likely to be destructive in developing countries (as 
Figure 1 suggests).  The remainder of this section sets out why that is likely to be the 
case.  In summary it is because inequality tends to undermine growth when it combines 
with or interacts with weak markets and poor government policy. In general in 
developing compared to developed countries, financial and other markets are less 
complete and public policy is less effective in addressing market failures and 
imperfections. 
Imperfect credit and other markets.   Benabou (1997) and Aghion et al (1999) develop 
models in which inequality exacerbates the effect of capital and other market failures on 
growth.  When creditworthy borrowers cannot borrow because they lack collateral to 
comfort lenders (given imperfect information, a market failure in itself), then their lack of 
income or wealth limits their ability to invest.  In addition, given limited liability (the 
borrower cannot repay more than her net worth), borrowers with less wealth have less 
incentive to exert effort to ensure success of an investment since they must pay lenders a 
higher portion of their returns (a moral hazard effect).  In this case redistributing wealth 
has no adverse incentive effects – on the contrary it creates a positive incentive  -- and 
will be growth-enhancing. Weak or nonexistent insurance markets will also force those 
without assets to bypass high-return projects.  Galor and Zeira (1993) and earlier Loury 
(1981) suggest that the distribution of wealth affects output due to the indivisibility of 
investments in human capital.  When it is difficult to borrow, lack of liquidity limits 
investments in human capital despite prospective high returns; this obviously affects the 
poor but may also affect the large majority of middle-income people in developing 
  8countries with high concentration of income at the top of the income distribution.  
Birdsall, Pinckney and Sabot (1998) note that even where the poor are credit-constrained, 
they can exploit an increase in the return to potential new investment (in education or 
their own farm or business) by increasing their work effort.  They will do so as long as 
the returns to their labor are adequate – as was the case in Korea and Taiwan in much of 
the postwar 20
th century.  If labor markets are functioning well, and returns to education 
or other investments are rising, the credit market may not matter as much.  Or in those 
countries, lower overall inequality of wealth, income and land (well below the Gini of 
0.45 on the distribution of income), may have minimized the negative effect on growth of 
an interaction between inequality and weak markets.
11
Obviously weaknesses in capital markets are greater in developing countries, as 
are compensatory policies such as enforcement of creditor rights.  They are also more 
likely the lower is average income and the higher the proportion of poor people, making 
it difficult to distinguish empirically between the negative effect of inequality per se 
(whether of income, wealth, education, land) interacting with weak markets from the 
negative effects of high rates of poverty.  In any event, whether because capital markets 
are weaker and more people are poorer, it is not surprising that inequality undermines 
growth in developing countries though not necessarily in developed countries.  
In these models, it is not actually income inequality but inequality of financial 
wealth or other assets that interacts with weak capital markets to reduce growth. (Only 
recently has household level data on financial wealth of reasonable comparability across 
                                                 
11 A closely related more Keynesian point is that greater inequality may depress 
aggregate demand, and thus investment incentives and growth.– even where markets are 
otherwise functioning well. See Chapter II. 14 in this volume.  
  9countries become available.
12)  But increasing evidence suggests that other assets—land 
and education—tell the same story.  Latin America still appears to bear the costs of its 
historic land inequality.  Carter and Coles (1998) show that concentration of land 
ownership is associated over long subsequent periods with concentration of income, even 
in countries where the economic relevance of agriculture has declined.  Birdsall and 
Londono (1997) show that across countries inequality in the distribution of education 
reduces growth, and that once inequality of land and education are accounted for, 
inequality of income washes out as a factor affecting growth.  In that respect, market 
economies in Latin America compared to East Asia, discussed below, do not operate 
differently—it is just that they operate in a context of high concentration of land and 
education. 
Ineffective or corrupt institutions of the state and resultant poor public policy.  As 
with weak markets, weak governments and poor public policy are likely to exacerbate the 
effects of inequality (of income, assets, education and so on) on growth.  Behrman, 
Birdsall, and Szekely (2000) show that differences across countries in social mobility, 
measured by differences in the effect of parents’ income and education on children’s 
education, are robustly and systematically affected by differences in two factors: public 
spending on primary education and the depth of financial markets. Repressed interest 
rates and directed credit programs that end up limiting access to credit except for 
privileged insiders worsen the effect of inherently imperfect capital markets on growth.  
Lack of adequate public spending on basic health and education means that public policy 
is not correcting for the inherent inability of markets alone to compensate for differences 
                                                 
12 Davies et al., 2006. 
  10across households in endowments of all kinds. Growth is then lower than it could be 
since aggregate accumulation of human capital is reduced.  
If income inequality interacting with poor policy reduces growth, then it is 
implicated in reduced poverty reduction—given that empirically growth has seemed 
necessary if not sufficient for reducing poverty, and since whatever growth occurs will 
help the poor less in an accounting sense the less equal the distribution of income 
(Ravallion, 1997; 2001).
13  There may also be a more substantive link of inequality to the 
persistence of poverty where state institutions and government policy fail to ensure equal 
opportunities for the poor, even when there is income growth on average.  Birdsall and 
Londono (1997) report that across countries in the period 1960 to 1990 greater land and 
education inequality reduced the income growth of the poorest quintile about twice as 
much as they reduced average income growth for all quintiles.
14  In the extreme, unequal 
distribution of land may cut off altogether the usual effect of growth in agriculture on 
reduction of rural poverty. Some evidence suggests that agricultural growth in Latin 
America in the 1970s and 1980s failed to reduce poverty at all (De Janvry and Sadoulet, 
2000), as large landowners captured most of the benefits.  In contrast, in Indonesia, where 
small farmers provide the bulk of agricultural production, growth was good for the rural 
poor even in the days of Sukarno and still better in the days of Suharto (Timmer, 2006a, 
2006b). 
                                                 
13 Ravallion (2001) reported an average elasticity of poverty reduction with respect to growth of -2.5, 
implying that for every one percent increase in the growth rate in average income, the proportion of the 
population living below $1/day falls by an average of 2.5%.   
14 See also Deininger and Squire, 1996.  These findings contrast with the conclusion that “Growth is Good 
for the Poor” in which Dollar and Kraay (2002) find that  average incomes of the poorest quintile rise 
proportionately with average incomes in a sample of 92 countries spanning the last four decades.  
  11Political instability and social conflict.  Initial theorizing put any negative effect 
of inequality on growth not on its interaction with weak markets or poor public policy, 
but through a direct effect in the political sphere as Benabou put it “where asset markets 
are complete and distributional effects arise solely from the balance of power in the 
political system.”
15  Economists suggested that higher inequality causes lower growth 
because the median voter, who is relatively poorer where inequality is high, votes for 
inefficient redistribution financed by growth-reducing higher taxes (Persson and 
Tabellini, 1994; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994).  Their cross-country tests were not, however, 
convincing. Moreover, the median voter theory did not square with anecdotal evidence 
that policies in unequal countries are often shaped not by the relatively poor median voter 
(even where there is democracy) but by a more politically influential elite,
16 and with 
lack of any evidence that redistributive policies, measured in terms of the marginal tax 
rate, are associated with lower growth (Easterly and Rebelo, 1993).   
An alternative political explanation blames political instability on “social 
discontent” (associated with inequality among other things) (Alesina and Perotti, 1996).  
Sociopolitical differences that reduce the security of property rights and the expected 
return on investment, thus reduce investment and subsequently growth.  In a test of the 
determinants of growth collapses after 1975, Rodrik (1999) found that high inequality 
and the quality of institutions that manage conflict were key underlying factors—not the 
size nor the intensity of external shocks. He argued that with high inequality, 
distributional conflicts would be more difficult to resolve, delaying fiscal and monetary 
adjustment and diverting productive resources to bargaining over distributional changes.  
                                                 
15 Benabou, 1996, p.3. 
16 De Mello and Tiongson, 2006 find no evidence that governments of highly unequal countries are more 
likely to attempt to redistribute income.  
  12Benabou (1996) notes that if the rich understand the implication for growth of rent-
seeking in unequal societies and of populist revolts, it may be in their collective interests 
to collectively transfer wealth to the poor through land reform, education subsidies, or 
trade protection.
17  The problem may be (as experience in Latin America and Africa 
suggest) that such transfers to be efficient and growth-enhancing require effective 
institutions of the state.  
 
Effect of Inequality on Political and Economic Institutions 
  A large literature is concerned with the importance of effective institutions for 
growth (for example North, 1990; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2004).  Does 
inequality (in some “initial” state) contribute to the failure of effective institutions to 
emerge in some societies?  Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2002) suggest that differences 
in the factor endowments of colonial North and South America contributed to differences 
in the concentration of income which in turn affected the evolution of different economic 
and political institutions.  Abundant slave or indigenous labor and soil and climate 
conducive to large plantation agriculture in the south, and the opportunities for extraction 
of mineral wealth, were conducive to high concentration of income, human capital, and 
political power. The elite in the south then tended to create and sustain institutional 
arrangements that protected their interests but did not encourage broad-based investment, 
for example in education or productive economic activity.  In contrast were the 
smallholder farms of the north, where the soils and climate were conducive to wheat, for 
                                                 
17 Similarly it is often in the collective interest of an ethnic or racial majority to support anti- discrimination 
and other policies and programs to reduce horizontal inequalities, i.e. inequalities among groups in 
political, economic and social dimensions, as these otherwise can provide the basis for inter-group 
animosity and fuel civil conflict (Stewart, 2001; Ostby, 2003).  See Chapter VII – 60: War and 
Development. 
  13example, and cheap labor was not available. In these settings, more democratic 
institutions evolved, property rights were broad-based, and a thriving smallholder class 
supported public financing of education and in general created local governments that 
were accountable to most citizens. 
  Public-choice models similarly attribute poor public policy to government 
regimes in which bureaucrats and insiders face no real checks on the pursuit of their own 
interests (Buchanan and Tollison, 1984).  If the rich favor public policy that preserves 
privileges independent of their economic efficiency, inequality may not only inhibit 
growth by interacting with government failure and poor public policy, as set out above, 
but may contribute to poor institutions and government failures in the first place. The 
problem seems especially great when concentration of income at the top is combined 
with substantial poverty at the bottom, and there is not a large middle class to demand 
accountability from government. Easterly (2001) and Easterly, Ritzen, and Woolcock 
(2006), use country level data on size of the middle class (instrumented by differences in 
commodities produced, recalling Engerman and Sokoloff), to study the determinants of 
good “institutions” (measured in terms of survey results on accountability, corruption, 
property rights and so on).  They conclude that a small middle class is implicated in weak 
institutions, and through weak institutions in low growth.    
  An example is the apparent relationship between a high concentration of income 
in a society and differences across countries in the policy and institutional capacity that 
ensure access to education – as in the difference between East Asia and Latin America in 
educational opportunities for the poor (Birdsall, Ross, and Sabot, 1997).  Supply of 
publicly subsidized education is likely to be limited where the rich resist a large tax 
  14burden to finance services they can purchase privately.  Targeting social services to the 
poor can help reduce the fiscal burden of greater public spending, but easily leads to loss 
of political support from the working and middle class.  Without middle class interest and 
pressure, the quality of public services deteriorates (and the middle class resorts to private 
services).
18   Thus it is possible for income inequality to contribute to poor public policy 
and institutions even where there is little or no absolute poverty—for example in U.S. 
cities.   
  It is also likely that high income inequality encourages rent-seeking by the rich 
through bribes and extortion in the political sphere, and populist and protectionist policies 
when those who feel disadvantaged acquire political voice.  Keefer and Knack (2002), 
like Easterly, Ritzen, and Woolcock (2006) find that income inequality is associated with 
weakening of the protection of property rights.
19
  In short, not only does theory and some evidence suggest inequality harms growth 
in interaction with poor public policy, it is plausible that high inequality more directly 
undermines good public policy by delaying or stalling the emergence of the political and 
economic institutions (property rights, an independent judiciary, accountability to voters 
and checks on abuse of privileges and power) —institutions that are increasingly viewed 
as fundamental to sustaining growth.   
 
                                                 
18 On the demand side, low public spending combined with pressure to maintain or expand enrollments has 
led to low-quality schools, reducing the economic returns to poor families of sending children to school 
who can otherwise help at home or work.. In effect schooling could be analyzed in terms of a two-sector 
model, with poor families confined to one sector with low returns, and the rich going to the other sector 
where returns are high.The difference in returns between poor and rich would explain the high dropout 
rates throughout much of Latin America, even in the face of high returns on average to those who manage 
to complete secondary school (Behrman and Birdsall, 1983).  
19 The importance of institutions in development is discussed further in Chapter VII-58: Institutions and 
Development.  
  15Effect of Inequality on Social Institutions (Social Capital and Collective Decision-
Making 
Amartya Sen places considerable emphasis on individuals’ “capability” to 
participate in the life of the community as an aspect of development independent of any 
implications for economic growth (Sen, 1992; Sen, 1999).  Participation in the life of the 
community suggests there are assets that are held not individually but only in relation to 
others; Putnam (1993) defines the asset of social capital in terms of trusts, norms and 
networks that can improve the efficiency of society, “facilitating coordinating actions.”  
Social capital may also have economic value to the extent it reduces the cost of 
transactions and of contract enforcement, and as Rodrik (1993; 1999) argues, reduces 
resistance of losing groups to political compromises. 
  There is good evidence from microeconomic analyses that income inequality 
adversely affects some of the inputs or correlates of social capital.  In Tanzania, informal 
insurance is higher in communities where income inequality is lower (La Ferrara, 2000).  
Among sugar cooperatives in India, where land ownership is more unequal, cooperatives 
are less productive (Banerjee et al., 2001).
20  The literature on local public finance 
addresses the same issue indirectly, in assessments of the link between income levels and 
the formation of communities with different amounts of heterogeneity.  A typical finding 
is that the quality of publicly provided education is inversely related to income inequality, 
controlling for average income (Fernandez and Rogerson, 2003). 
                                                 
20 In the U.S. the percentage of households that participate in various membership organizations is higher in 
metropolitan areas with lower income inequality – controlling for racial and ethnic heterogeneity, income, 
education, and other household characteristics.  The effect is substantial.  An increase in the Gini 
coefficient of inequality by one standard deviation leads to a reduction in the probability of participation of 
24 percentage points – more than two times the effect on participation of an individual going from the 
status of high school dropout to high school graduate or more (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000) 
  16Finally there is the evidence from studies of crime and violence.  Fajnzylber, 
Lederman, and Loayza (2002) assessed the impact of inequality on homicide rates in a 
cross section of 39 countries over the period 1965-95.  Income inequality measured by 
the Gini coefficient had a significant and positive effect on homicide rates, robust to a 
variety of specifications.  Ratios of income of contiguous quintiles starting with the 
second quintile (that is, third to second, fourth to third, and fifth to fourth) exacerbate 
crime, and at an increasing rate.  In other words, it was not poverty or inequality at the 
bottom that explained crime, but the disparity between the middle strata and their richer 
counterparts.  It was not absolute but relative income that mattered. 
It is difficult to distinguish conceptually between the effects of inequality on 
political and economic institutions and on such “social” institutions as social capital and 
shared civic customs and habits.  To some extent that may be because across societies 
such “institutions” as broad-based property rights, democracy with checks on abuse of 
power, and “trust” among citizens, tend to be correlated with each other.  In any event, 
evidence suggests that in each category, such institutions have evolved less successfully 
where income inequality has been high.    
 
Inequality and Growth in East Asia vs. Latin America  
In 1960, average real per capita income in Latin America was higher than in East 
Asia.  Since then, average per capita income has risen almost ten-fold in East Asia 
whereas in Latin America it has less than doubled (table 1).  In 1960, income and land 
inequality were significantly higher and income concentration much more extreme in 
Latin America compared to East Asia.  (table 2); Taiwan and Korea both benefited from 
  17externally imposed land reform after World War II. 
21  The contrast over four decades 
between fast-growing East Asia, with its relatively low inequality in 1960 (compared to 
Latin America, and in particular in fast-growing Korea and Taiwan compared to Thailand 
and Indonesia) and slow-growing Latin America, with its very high inequality (Figure 2), 
is consistent with the theory and evidence reported above: that high inequality in 
developing countries, where it is likely to combined with imperfect and weak markets 
and poor government policy, reduces an economy’s growth prospects; and that high 
“initial” inequality puts at risk the development of the economic, political and social 
institutions that support deeper markets, better government, and sustained growth.
22   
Rapid growth in East Asia is associated with the region’s early export push, 
supported by high savings and investment and healthy rates of total factor productivity 
growth in manufacturing (World Bank, 1993).  Behind export success were other factors 
rooted in rapid changes in household decisions and behavior.  Those other factors 
included unprecedented gains in small farmers’ agricultural productivity, high demand 
for schooling including of girls, and declines in fertility far more rapid than and at lower 
income levels than had occurred in the industrialized economies (Birdsall and Sabot, 
2002).  Governments generally ensured that exchange rates were competitive and that 
fiscal discipline kept inflation low.  Governments also favored public investment in basic 
(primary and secondary) education.  
In Latin America, inflation and overvalued exchange rates penalized agriculture, 
and were combined with tariff and other protection of industry and subsidies to capital 
                                                 
21 Land inequality is still extremely high in Latin America. 
22 Rapid growth in East Asia without accompanying increases in inequality also contravenes the pattern 
suggested by Kuznets.  More recently in China, rapid growth has been accompanied by rising inequality. 
  18that may have reduced the demand for labor. Spending on education was comparable to 
that in East Asia but was much more concentrated on highly subsidized university 
education for a select few, responding to the demands of richer households.  In 1960s, 
educational attainment of the adult population was at roughly the same levels in East Asia 
and Latin America, and inequality of education (measured in terms of number of years of 
schooling achieved) actually higher in East Asia.  Since then, educational attainment has 
risen more quickly in East Asia and education inequality has fallen faster (Birdsall and 
Londono, 1998).  Broad-based investment in basic education in East Asian countries led 
to substantial growth of labor productivity and enabled firms to acquire and adapt new 
technologies and move up the value-chain as increasingly skilled cohorts of workers 
became available (Schultz, 1961; Romer, 1994).  The export-push, labor demanding 
strategy chosen by East Asian countries generated the conditions for a savings and 
investment boom in middle-income and poor households and farms (Birdsall, Pinckney, 
and Sabot, 1998). 
  It seems plausible that one region’s lower inequality compared to the other, among 
other things, affected the difference in the two regions’ subsequent trajectories of growth, 
inequality, and investment in human capital.  The story is not straightforward.  Latin America 
has a longer history of democracy, for example.  But the differences do suggest that the 
potential negative effect of inequality—of income, land, and other assets—on growth and on 
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Sources: WDI (2005), WIDER (2005), and authors’ calculations. 
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Average real GDP per 
capita growth rate
(percent)
1960 2000 1960 2000 1960 2000 1960 2000 1960-2000
Latin America
1 0.51 0.53 1.7 1.1 42.5 40.5 1,950 3,050 1.1
East Asia
2 0.42 0.43 2.6 2.1 32.4 34.4 1,300 11,740 5.7
China 0.32 0.39 n/a n/a n/a n/a 100 860 5.6
Mexico 0.53 0.54 1.3 1.1 41.9 41.8 2,560 5,930 2.1
Note:
All group averages are unweighted.  n/a indicates data not available.
Sources: WDI (2005) and WIDER (2005).
1. Latin America includes Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela.  1960 and 2000 income gini data not available for Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Paraguay.
2. East Asia includes Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand, but excludes China.
4. East Asia excludes Singapore.  Latin America excludes Bolivia, Chile, Honduras, and Peru.  
3. 1960 data are for earliest year available for the period 1958-1968.  2000 data are for latest year available for the period 1996-2001.
Income Gini
3 GDP per capita         
(constant 2000 US$)









1960 2000 1960 2000 1960s 1990s
Latin America
1
mean 0.51 0.53 0.53 0.42 0.83 0.81
standard deviation 0.06 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.06 0.07
East Asia
2
mean 0.42 0.43 0.58 0.35 0.47 0.42
standard deviation 0.04 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.07
China 0.32 0.39 n / a0 . 3 8n / a n / a
Mexico 0.53 0.54 0.56 0.36 0.62 n/a
Note:
All group averages are unweighted.  n/a indicates data not available.
3. 1960 data are for earliest year available for the period 1958-1968 and 2000 data are for latest year available for the period 1996-2001.
4. Education ginis for population aged 15 years and over.





1. Latin America includes Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 1960 and 2000 income gini data not available for Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Paraguay.
2. East Asia includes Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand.
5. East Asia average excludes Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and Malaysia for which data are not available.  Latin America average excludes Bolivia, 
Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Guatemala.
Table 1.  Inequality, Income and Growth in Latin America and East Asia, 1960 and 2000 
 
Table 2.  Income, Education and Land Inequality in Latin America and East Asia, 1960 and 2000 
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